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[L. A. No. 22671. In Bank. July 3, 1953.] 
ESTELLE MARRION BROWN, Respondent, v. ROSE M. 
JENSEN et al., Appellants. 
[1] Trust Deeds-Remedies-Foreclosure.-Under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 726, there may be only one action for recovery of a debt 
secured by trust deed, which action is one of foreclosure, and 
compliance must be had with the conditions of the chapter 
in which § 726 appears. 
[2] !d.-Remedies-Action on Debt.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 726, 
where the security has been exhausted or rendered valueless 
through no fault of the mortgag·ee or beneficiary under a trust 
deed, an action may be brought on the debt on the theory 
that limitation to the single action of foreclosure refers to 
time the action is brought rather than when the trust deed 
was made, and that if the security is lost or has become value-
less at time action is commenced, the debt is no longer secured. 
[3] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a, 580d Construed.-
Code Civ. Proc., § 580a, applying fair market value test of 
§ 726 to sales made without court assistance under power of 
sale contained in a trust deed, and § 580d, declaring that no 
judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency on a note secured 
by a trust deed where the property has been sold under power 
of sale contained in the trust deed, indicate a considered course 
on part of Legislature to limit strictly the right to recover 
deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more than 
the value of the security. 
[4] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 580b, dealing with a trust deed given to secure to ven-
dor of property the purchase price agreed to be paid by vendee, 
is necessarily intended to provide a protection for the trustor 
because if it were intended to cover only the situation where 
there has been an actual sale of the security under power of 
sale in the trust deed, it would be superfluous in view of 
§ 580d, which covers precisely that situation in all trust deeds, 
whether purchase money or otherwise. 
[5] Id.- Deficiency- Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-The 
broad protection provision of Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, for pur-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, §52; Am.Jur., Mortgages, § 529 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trust Deeds, §50; [2] Trust Deeds, 
§ 49; [3-8] Trust Deeds,§ 95(2). 
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chase money trust deeds stnnds on a reasonable footing; un-
like an ordinary trust de<'d and not<' on which only an action 
to foreclm;e may he brought under ~ 726, unless the security 
has become valueless at time the action is commenced, the 
nature of a purchase money trust deed is fixed for all time 
when such instrument is executed, and as so fixed no deficiency 
judgment may be obtained regardless of whether the security 
later becomes valueless. 
[6a, 6b] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-If 
vendor of realty takes a purchase money trust deed on prop-
erty at time of its purchase, Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, preclud-
ing deficiency judgments following sales under a purchase 
money trust deed, is applicable, and vendor may look only 
to the security for recovery of the debt. 
[7] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-One tak-
ing a purchase money trust deed knows the value of his security 
and assumes the risk that it may become inadequate, especially 
where he takes a second purchase money trust deed, and he is 
precluded by Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, from bringing an action 
on the note after the security has become valueless because 
of sale of the security under first purchase money trust deed. 
[8] Id.- Deficiency- Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-While 
Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, speaks of a deficiency judgment after 
sale of the security, this means after an actual sale or a 
situation where a sale would be an idle act where the security 
has been exhausted; the deficiency judgment which cannot be 
obtained is still a deficiency judgment even though it may con-
sist of the whole debt, because a deficiency is nothing more 
than the difference between the security and the debt. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Reversed. 
Action on a promissory note. Judgment for plaintiff re-
versed with directions. 
Ned P. Eads and Don D. Bercu for Appellants. 
Bertram S. Harris for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff on a promissory note. 
Plaintiff was the owner of real property which, on April 
26, 1950, she sold to defendants, Rose Jensen and Leota Trip-
[6] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 86 et seq.; Am.Jur., Mortgages, 
§ 857 et seq. 
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lett. As a part of the purchase price and on the same day, 
defendants executed in favor of Glendale Federal Savings 
and Loan Association (hereafter called Federal) a note for 
$11,300, secured by a first trust deed on the property. At 
the same time, and also as a part of the purchase price, a 
second note was executed by them in favor of plaintiff for 
$7,200, secured by a second trust deed on the property. Hence 
both trust deeds were purchase money trust deeds. 
It does not appear from the pleadings or findings how the 
first trust deed was "foreclosed," that is, whether by court 
action or by the exercise of the power of sale thereunder. 
While it is stated simply that the property was ''sold under 
foreclosure,'' it appears from the affidavits on motion for a 
summary judgment that the sale was under the power of 
sale in the trust deed. Neither of the notes had been paid 
and Federal had the property sold pursuant to the power 
of sale and bid it in for $11,896.63, and a trustees' deed was 
thereupon delivered to Federal. Plaintiff made no attempt 
to buy the property at the sale so as to protect her second 
trust deed. 
Plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action on her note, 
and to meet the claim that but one action could be brought 
on a debt secured by a trust deed, namely, one for foreclosure 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 726), alleged that her security (her sec-
ond trust deed) had become valueless because it had become 
exhausted by the sale under the first trust deed. [1] Under 
section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there may be 
only one action for the recovery of a debt secured by a trust 
deed, which action is one of foreclosure. In addition com-
pliance must be had with the conditions of the chapter in 
which section 726 appears. One of these conditions is that 
any deficiency judgment is limited to the difference between 
the fair market value of the property and the amount for 
which the property was sold. [2] It has been held under 
that section that where the security has been exhausted or 
rendered valueless through no fault of the mortgagee, or 
beneficiary under a trust deed, an action may be brought 
on the debt on the theory that the limitation to the single 
action of foreclosure refers to the time the action is brought 
rather than when the trust deed was made, and that if the 
security is lost or has beeome valueless at the time the aetion 
is commenced, the debt is no longer secured. (Security-
First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 31 Cal.App.2d 182 [87 P.2d 
724]; Hellman Com.. T. & S. Bank v. Maurice, 105 Cal.App. 
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653 [288 P. 683] ; Fen·y v. Fisk, 54 Cal.App. 763 [202 P. 
964] ; Crescent Lumber Co. v. Larson, 166 Cal. 168 [135 P. 
502] ; Otto v. Long, 127 Cal. 471 [59 P. 895] ; Savings Bank v. 
Central Market Co., 122 Cal. 28 [54 P. 273]; Commercial 
Bank v. Kershner, 120 Cal. 495 [52 P. 848]; Merced Security 
Sav. Bank v. Casaccia, 103 Cal. 641 [37 P. 648] ; Salter- v. 
Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263 [138 P.2d 7, 146 A.L.R. 1344] ; Repub-
lic Truck Sales Cm·p. v. Peak, 194 Cal. 492 [229 P. 331] .) 
That rule has been applied in favor of a second mortgagee, 
the security being considered lost or valueless as to him, 
where a first mortgagee forecloses his mortgage and the 
property is sold for no more than the senior debt and a deed 
has been given. (Savings Bank v. Central Mar-ket Co., 
S1tpra, 122 Cal. 28; Giandeini v. Ramirez, 11 Cal.App.2d 469 
[54 P.2d 91] .) 
It would appear from the facts here presented that plain-
tiff has brought herself within those rules and hence section 
726 is not an obstacle to her action on the promissory note. 
There are, however, add,itional restrictions on deficiency 
judgments on secured debts. Defendants pleaded section 
580b of the Code of Civil Procedure,* and as seen the facts 
here show that plaintiff's second trust deed is clearly a pur-
chase money trust deed. It is urged, however, that inasmuch 
as there has not been a sale by plaintiff under her trust deed 
within the wording of section 580b, supra, it does not apply. 
It is further urged that it does not apply because the security 
has become valueless by reason of the sale under Federal's 
first trust deed, and the case is not one involving a '' defi-
ciency" as there cannot be a deficiency if there is no security 
to sell because it presupposes a partial satisfaction of the 
debt by a sale which exhausts the security. 
In order to solve this question there must be a further 
examination of the code sections. There are other restric-
tions besides section 726, supra, and 580b, supra. [3] Sec-
tion 580a applies the fair market value test of section 726 
to sales made without court assistance under a power of sale 
contained in a trust deed. Section 580d goes further and 
provides that no judgment shall be rendered for any defi-
*"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real 
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, 
or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the 
balance of the purchase price of real property. 
"Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage 
have been given to secure payment of the balance of the combined pur-
chase price of both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment 
shall lie at any time under any one thereof." (Code Oiv. Proc., § 580b.) 
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ciency on a note secured by a trust deed where the property 
has been sold under the power of sale (as distinguished 
from a sale in a foreclosure action) contained in the trust 
deed. These provisions indicate a considered course on the 
part of the Legislature to limit strictly the right to recover 
deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more 
than the value of the security. [4] Next comes section 580b, 
supra, here involved, which deals with a special type of 
security transaction, a trust deed, given to secure to the 
vendor of property the purchase price agreed to be paid by 
the vendee. That section is necessarily intended to provide 
a protection for the trustor because if it were intended to 
cover only the situation where there has been an actual sale 
of the security under the power of sale in the trust deed, it 
would be superfluous. Section 580d covers precisely that 
situation in all trust deeds, whether purchase money or other-
wise. [5] The broad protection provision (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 580b) for purchase money trust deeds stands on a reason-
able footing. A purchase money trust deed is not like an 
ordinary trust, deed and note upon which only one action 
may be brought under section 726. Under section 726, as 
above stated, it is held that whether there is a security is 
determined as of the time the action is commenced and if 
the security is lost or has become valueless, an action on 
the note will lie because the events which caused it to become 
valueless were beyond the control of the trustor and were not 
contemplated at the time the money was loaned and the trust 
deed given. With purchase money trust deeds, however, 
the character of the transaction must necessarily be deter-
mined at the time the trust deed is executed. Its nature is 
then :fixed for all time and as so :fixed no deficiency judg-
ment may be obtained regardless of whether the security 
later becomes valueless. 
[6a] The question is, therefore, did plaintiff take a pur-
chase money trust deed on the property when it was pur-
chased? If she did, then section 580b is applicable and she 
may look only to the security. That is the clear import of 
the wording of section 580b. [7] The one taking such a 
trust deed knows the value of his security and assumes the 
risk that it may become inadequate. Especially does he know 
the risk where he takes, as was done here, a second trust deed. 
[8] It is true that the section speaks of a deficiency judg-
ment after sale of the security but that means after an actual 
sale or a situation where a sale would be an idle act, where, 
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as here, the security has been nxhansted. The deficiency 
judgment which cannot be obtained is still a deficiency judg-
ment even though it may consist of the whole debt because 
a deficiency is nothing more than the difference between the 
security and the debt, or, as was said in Carr v. Cleveland 
Trttst Co., (Ohio App.) 74 N.E.2d 124, 128 (in dealing with 
a case where the sale under the first mortgage produced only 
enough to pay it and the effect of a two-year limitation 
period for obtaining a deficiency judgment on a mortgage 
secured debt against the holder of a note secured by a second 
mortgage) : ''But in whatever light we view the proceedings 
which took place, either by way of foreclosure or by separate 
personal judgment on the note, one fact stands out in bold 
relief and that is that a deficiency judgment resulted from 
the entire proceedings by reason whereof the plaintiffs are 
entitled to whatever benefits accrue from the provisions of .the 
deficiency judgment act so-called." [6b] Indeed the pur-
pose of section 580b is that " ... for a purchase money 
mortgage or deed of trust the security alone can be looked 
to for recovery of the debt." (Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. 
Sampsell, 51 Cal.App.2d 180, 185 [124 P.2d 353] .) The 
section states that in no event shall there be a deficiency 
judgment, that is, whether there is a sale under the power 
of sale or sale under foreclosure, or no sale because the se-
curity has become valueless or is exhausted. The purpose of 
the ''after sale'' reference in the section is that the security 
be exhausted and that result follows after a sale under the 
first trust deed. 
The foregoing construction of section 580b is further for-
tified by the last paragraph thereof, sttpra, for it provides 
that where a chattel and real property mortgage are given 
to secure the purchase price of real and personal property, 
no deficiency judgment shall be given at any time under 
either of them. 
Plaintiff relies on Hillen v. Soule, 7 Cal.App.2d 45 [ 45 
P.2d 349], involving an action on a promissory note secured 
by a purchase money trust deed which was inferior to a first 
trust deed which was foreclosed and the security thereby 
exhausted. It was held that section 580b was not applicable 
because plaintiff's action was not for a deficiency judgment 
as the security was exhausted and plaintiff had not sold under 
his trust deed. That conclusion is out of harmony with the 
foregoing discussion. Evidently the factors above discussed 
were not called to the court's attention. In the later case 
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of Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, supra, 51 Cal.A.pp.2d 
180, 185, the court states that the security alone may be 
looked to for payment of a debt secured by a purchase money 
trust deed. However, the result reached in the Hillen case 
was correct because the trust deeds there were given in 1927 
before the adoption of section 580b (section 580b was added 
to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1933, Stats. 1933, p. 1673) 
and hence that section could not have been applicable there. 
The judgment is reversed and the court directed to enter 
judgment for defendants. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, ,J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion declares that "section 726 is not an 
obstacle" to plaintiff's action on her promissory note, but 
it holds that plaintiff's action is one for a ''deficiency judg-
ment" within the meaning of section 580b of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and is therefore barred by the terms of that sec-
tion. I cannot agree with this last mentioned conclusion. 
The security afforded by plaintiff's second deed of trust was 
extinguished by the sale held under the power of sale in the 
first deed of trust. Therefore, there never had been a sale 
under the power of sale contained in plaintiff's second deed 
of trust. 
A reading of sections 580a, 580b, 580c and 580d of the 
Code of Civil Procedure makes it entirely clear that the words 
"deficiency judgment" are consistently used therein in their 
ordinary meaning. They refer to a judgment sought for the 
balance allegedly due upon the personal obligation imposed 
by a written instrument secured by a deed of trust or mortgage 
''following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of 
trust or mortgage . . . '' (Code Civ. Proc., § 580a; emphasis 
added) and where "the real property has been sold by the 
mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in s1wh 
a mortgage or deed of trust'' (Code Civ. Proc., § 580d; em-
phasis added) . 
The decisions in this state show that this is the meaning 
which has been heretofore given to the words "deficiency 
jndgrneut," as u~ed in section 580a. (Hatch v. Secur,ity-Fi1·st 
Nat. Bank, 19 Cal.2d 254, 258 [120 P.2d 869]; Bank of 
Ameriaa v. Gillett, 36 Cal.App.2d 453, 456 [97 P.2d 875]; 
see Bank of America v. Hunter, 8 Cal.2d 592, 597-598 [67 
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P.2d 99]; Everts Y. Matteson, 21 Cal.2d 437, 448 [132 P.2d 
476] .) It is also the common meaning attached to the term 
in other jurisdictions. (Phillips v. Union Central Life Ins. 
Co., 88 :B1 .2d 188, 189; Bank of Douglas v. N eel, 30 Ariz. 375 
[247 P. 132, 133]; Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Really Co., 101 
Pla. 1324 [133 So. 569, 135 So. 795, 797] ; Harrow v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 349 [280 N.W. 785, 788] ; 
Tiedeman v. Dorn, 137 Misc. 136 [241 N.Y.Supp. 490, 492-
493] ; Stretch v. 1llurphy, 166 Ore. 439 [112 P.2d 1018, 1021] ; 
Bailey v. Block, 104 'l'ex. 101 [134 S.W. 323, 325] ; 59 C.J.S. 
1474.) 
Section 580b was originally enacted with section 580a in 
1!)33 ( Stats. 1933, pp. 1672, 1673), and the meaning of "de-
fieiency judgment" was undoubtedly intended to be the same 
for both sections. \Yhen !Section 580d was added in 1940 
( Stats. 1st :BJx. Sess. 1940, ch. 29, § 2), it was again made clear 
that ''deficiency judgment'' referred to a judgment sought 
for the balance allegedly due a person whose obligation had 
been secured by a deed of trust or mortgage and where the 
real property had been sold "under power of sale contained 
in such a mortgage or deed of trust.'' \Vhile sections 580b 
and 580d do overlap to some extent, section 580b cannot be 
properly characterized as ''superfluous.'' 
In 1935 and shortly after the enactment of section 580b, 
it was construed with relation to similar facts in Hillen v. 
So1de, 7 Cal.App.2d 45 [45 P.2d 349]. It was there said: 
''Appellant first contends that this is an action for a deficiency 
judgment after a sale under a deed of trust given to secure 
the balance of the purchase price of real property, and that 
such action cannot be maintained by reason of the provisions 
of section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a suffi-
cient answer to state that this is not an action for a deficiency 
judgment. The security was exhausted by the sale under the 
first deed of trust and no sale was had under respondent's 
deed of trust. Vve are therefore of the opinion that the 
provisions of said section are inapplicable." (P. 47.) 
The Legislature has twice amended section 580b since this 
construction was placed upon the words ''deficiency judg-
ment." (Stats. 1935, pp. 1806, 1869; Stats. 1949, ch. 1599, 
§ l.) As no change was made by these amendments in the 
phrase ''deficiency judgment,'' it may be assumed that the 
I.Jegislature approved the construction placed on that term in 
Hillen v. Soule, supra, 7 Cal.App.2d 45. Purthermore, the 
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wording of section 580d as enacted in 1940 also indicates snch 
legislative approval. 
T!Je evil motivating the Legislature in enacting these sec-
tions was that "creditors were frequently able to hid in the 
debtor's real property at a nominal figure and also to hold 
the debtor personally liable for a large proportion of the 
original debt. (Hatch v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, 
19 Cal.2d 254, 259; see 22 Cal.L.Rev. 170, 180.) The purpose 
was not to prevent any recovery where the security had be-
come completely valueless or a senior mortgagee had fore-
closed, leavtng no security for the junior debt. 
Thus, it appears to me that the majority opinion has 
stretched the meaning of section 580b far beyond its terms. 
Both seetions 580b and 580d prevent the holder of a purchase 
money deed of trust from having a ''deficiency judgment'' 
after a sale under such a deed of trust. They do not cover 
the situation where no sale has been held under such deed 
of trust and no "deficiency judgment" is sought. To so con-
strue these sections results in placing the holder of a purehase 
money note secured by a seeond deed of trust in a less favor-
able position than the holder of an unsecured note given for 
such purchase money. The Legislature has not so declared. 
Until it does so, the courts should not enter the legislative 
field by broadening the terms of statutes beyond their common 
meaning and contrary to the judicial interpretation which had 
been placed thereon prior to the time that the parties entered 
into their contractual relations. 
The majority opinion relies on Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. 
Sarnpscll, 51 Cal.App.2d 180 [124 P.2d 353]. It is sufficient 
to state that that case did not present the question herr in-
volved. The broad language quoted by the majority opinion 
is mere dictum, unnecessary to the decision of that case. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 
1953. Spence, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
